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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
We tend to think of ideology as something like Marxism or liberalism, an elaborate 
state-sponsored politico-philosophical conceptual system, overt and explicit. Not to 
distinguish between complex ideologies, and ordinary ideas, beliefs, myths, 
prejudices etc., is to lose a whole level of analysis, and fails to differentiate between 
some rather low-level, trivial kinds of ideas, and more powerful, state-sanctioned or 
religious ideologies. It also fails to look at the components or elements of the 
ideological system, but treats them as an undifferentiated whole. Religious ideologies 
that influence language would of course include such things as the stance of Islam 
toward language (especially the status of Arabic, in the Koran), Christian and Jewish 
ideas expressed by terms such as "And God said, let there be light" or "In the beginning 
there was the Word, and the word was with God, and the word was God." “Nobody,” 
says Terry Eagleton, “has yet come up with a single adequate definition of ideology” 
(Eagleton, 1991). Eagleton may be right as far as the wording of the concept of ideology 
is concerned. However, scholars generally agree on the social nature of ideology: it is 
about social relations, consciousness, and the power struggle which plays important 
parts in carrying out ideological objectives. Ideology, thus, is also about the 
consciousness of these relations (Kelle and Kovalson, 1973; Gouldner, 1976; 
Thompson, 1984; Fairclough, 1989). Because definitions of ideology have as their 
context Western society and its political- economic problems and issues, it would be 
relevant also to consider non-Western perspectives on ideology. For instance, in the 
Islamic context, ideology is not a negative concept. It is, indeed, an exceedingly 
positive, inspirational notion which governs people’s lives. From the Islamic point of 
view, ideology and religion do not exclude each other: ideological truths are religious 
truths and vice versa (Fitzgerald, 2003). Islamic scholars have claimed that there is no 
difference between the Islamic and the ideological (Nasr, 1994). For an Islamist a 
statement like, “The ideas of the ruling class are in every epoch the ruling ideas, i.e., 
the class which is the ruling material force of society, is at the same time its ruling 
intellectual force” (Marx and Engels, 1974) should be meaningless. The positive image 
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of ideology in Islam can be understood from the fact that the most influential Islamic 
scholars of the twentieth century have argued that Islam is not a religion, but an 
ideology. 
Ideology endeavors (or claims) to change a situation/system (e.g., Lenin in the former 
Soviet Union, Hitler in Germany, Castro in Cuba, the Ayatollah in Iran). But once a 
system has been established, the same ideology can be used as an instrument to 
maintain the status quo. The Bolsheviks in the former Soviet Union, and Ayatollah 
Khomeini claimed to move into new eras of change, prosperity, and equality (Beetham, 
1991); hence, the centrality of the role of the systematic use of power and myth-making 
in ideology. Ideology, says Lemberg, is synonymous with myth because both are 
“systems of ideas which constitute and pilot the large power blocks of our society” 
(Eugen Lemberg cited by Wodak, 1989). By “systematic exercise of power” is meant 
that an ideological movement or struggle is based on a definite line of action, and is not 
random. Power is “the production of intended effects” (Russell 1995 [1938]:), or one’s 
“ability to produce intended effects upon the world around them” (Beetham, 1991). 
The following ideas were developed by George Herbert Mead (1964) and by 
structuralists such as Claude Levi-Strauss, beliefs about social issues, meanings of 
pertinent events, feelings about problems, role definitions and self-conceptions can be 
considered integral parts of a single cognitive structure, each facet of which defines and 
reinforces the others. Conventional thinking about each part of such a structure as being 
distinct and arrived at independently, enhances confidence in and attachment to them. 
Because they may be false, but nonetheless give meaning to events: such structures are 
forms of myth. The more critical reason why linguistic cues are evocative of larger 
belief structures must lie in the mutually reinforcing character of the distinct parts of 
any structure of ideological cognitions—their transformations into each other. Any one 
of these beliefs inevitably implies the others. 
Levi-Strauss declares that "the purpose of myth is to provide a logical model capable of 
overcoming a contradiction [an impossible achievement if as it happens, the 
contradiction is real]...." (Levi-Strauss et al., 1963). Each of the primitive and religious 
myths he analyzes in his own work includes the oppositions and contradictions within 
itself. In the case of political myths, the basic function of overcoming a contradiction is 
still central, but there are pairs of opposing myths for each of the conflicting cognitive 
patterns that define attitudes toward social problems, authorities who deal with them 
and people who suffer from them. Our ambivalence is expressed in separate, 
concomitant myths, which are internally consistent, but inconsistent with each other. 
The structural difference between ideological and folk myths makes sense when we 
recall that a ideological myth serves to express and to undergird conflict between 
organized political groups as well as within the individual. As members of political 
parties, ideological groups and social movements, individuals lean toward one mythic 
pattern or the other. In this way, organized conflict between groups reflects separate 
mythic patterns. At the same time, the availability in the culture of the opposing myth 
permits the individual to reconcile contradictions and live with his ambivalence. 
The following generalizations can be made about the structure of ideological myths:  
 
1)  For any pattern of beliefs about a controversial issue, the various components of 
the cognitive structure (beliefs about the cause of the problem, the roles of 
authorities, the classification of people according to levels of merit and the 
effective remedies) reinforce and evoke each other.  
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2) Myths regarding social problems conventionally classified as different (crime, 
poverty, mental illness) include the same fundamental mythemes.  
 
3) Minor variations in the same basic myth at different times and different places 
reflect and express the range of tensions and intellectual impulses within the 
society.  
 
4) The two mythic patterns that reflect conflicting cognitions remain separate, 
though both remain available for use when groups or individuals need them to 
resolve conflicts. 
 
5) A fifth generalization, following another lead suggested by Levi-Strauss, is that 
the actions governments take to cope with social problems often contradict, as 
well as reflect, the myths used to rationalize them. 
 
Perhaps the archetypical device for influencing opinion regarding ideological issues and 
actors is the evocation of beliefs about problems, intentions or moral conditions of large 
groups of people whose very existence is problematic, who become the benchmarks by 
which real people shape their political beliefs and perceptions. Sometimes such myths 
are essentially accurate. Politicians' statements about people's attitudes or situations are 
often impossible to verify or quite clearly invalid. Anxious people reliant upon dubious 
and conflicting cues usually choose from available public messages one that supports a 
policy consistent with their economic interests or ideological bent. The facts regarding 
controversial political issues are typically so complex, difficult to observe and 
ambiguous that it is usually easy to find a set of allegations that serve this rationalizing 
function and are not manifestly untrue. They can be and sometimes are deliberate lies; 
they are often interpretations their audience would recognize as dubious if enough was 
known about the observations on which they are based. Sometimes they are factual. As 
influences upon political opinion, however, their verifiability is less important than their 
availability. 
 
2. LANGUAGE AND IDEOLOGY 
 
Language is one of the givens in our lives.  In this regard, Paul Ricoeur (1981) notes 
“the impossibility of reaching a social reality prior to symbolization.” Nevertheless, 
despite the ways in which our native language structures our initial ways of describing 
the world, linguists and philosophers of language have offered various accounts of how 
language changes and arguments concerning whether such changes are creative. Less 
frequently addressed are questions about how to assess the perceptual implications of 
these linguistic innovations (Goodman, 1978). In language, the processes of creativity 
and distortion are interrelated.  However, the conclusion is one which proposes a 
distinction between and criterion for “positive” changes or creative distortions and 
“negative” changes or distortive creations (Gay, 1992).  Nevertheless, creative 
distortions are not associated exclusively with metaphors and distortive creations 
exclusively with ideologies.  For metaphor and ideology, “positive” and “negative” 
depend on how practical activity is facilitated, using a criterion of expansion or 
enrichment versus contraction or impoverishment of the semiotic-perceptual 
field.  Hence, throughout we will stress how metaphor and ideology are similar, not how 
they are different. 
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Much philosophical effort has been expended in making the rather obvious point that a 
one-to-one correspondence between words (signs) and things (reference) is neither 
actual nor practical. Despite common rejection of even the possibility of such 
correspondence, theories of reference typically do not imply that because strict 
similitude of or correlation between words and things is absent that ineradicable 
incommensurability of or disproportionality between words and things is present.  To 
affirm the latter is to abandon the quest for any instances of referentially transparent and 
unambiguous discourse.  Because at least this quest is necessary if any spheres for the 
application of linguistic positivism are to be prescribed, some look for instances of such 
discourse and assume that, otherwise, we would have a “distinction without a 
difference.” The methodological guard against this situation is often termed the 
“principle of no vacuous contrast,” i.e., the requirement that a genuine predicate can 
never refer to either everything or nothing within its ‘universe of discourse.’ (Dray, 
1964). In other words, talk of distorted communication presumably makes sense only if 
non-distorted communication is also actual or, at least, possible.  In the 
phenomenological tradition, Merleau-Ponty argued quite early that language is 
unalterably and ubiquitously allusive and implied that creative language is intentionally 
distortive.  He even went so far as to correlate such linguistic creativity with authentic 
language.  Hereby, he, along with Heidegger and others, initiated the over-emphasis 
within much phenomenology on creative speech as authentic.  When taken in isolation, 
some of Ricoeur’s work, especially his remarks on metaphor, can be viewed as falling 
victim to the same error. For Merleau-Ponty and Ricoeur, at any moment chosen, a 
given lexicon establishes set oppositions which function as a totality.  Since “the 
learned parts of a language have an immediate value as a whole,” (Merleau-Ponty, 
1964) a speaker moves from one ‘whole’ to another ‘whole’ (each a temporarily 
‘closed’ totality) with the expression of new oppositions.  Hence, acquisition is a 
process of internal division of a whole into further differences that are articulated in 
terms of more specific oppositions.  This fact makes complete equivalence adequation 
between words and things unrealizable.  Because internal division can in principle 
progress ad infinitum, Merleau-Ponty (1964) claims “the genesis of meaning is never 
completed.”  Moreover, he maintains that “all language is indirect or allusive--that it’s, 
if you wish, silence.” Conversely, complete expression (direct and fully adequate 
signification) would be possible only if a specific language at a particular synchronic 
moment ‘captures’ things themselves in their forms.  If expression were transparent, we 
would see through the glass of language clearly rather than dimly. If language per se is 
allusive and if expression depends on using signs against signs, then no standards for 
transparency exist which preclude the possibility that experimentation with how signs 
are opposed might better convey the meaning one intends to express.  To speak or to 
write places a panel of glass before one’s audience providing an invitation to perceive in 
terms of its idiosyncratic focus.  Sometimes, when previous perception is jolted rather 
strongly by new combinations of signs, creative distortions result; we see things in an 
altered light, from a different angle, in a “new sense.”  Implicitly realizing the 
inadequacy of words to things, we often applaud the subtle nuance that even blatant 
distortions sometimes facilitate.  We accept this practice in poetry; in fact, we employ 
metaphor across the board.  But theories of linguistic creativity too easily assume that 
such innovations are in toto authentic, enriching creations, albeit distortive like all the 
rest.  Rejecting any exact knowledge of or adequate language for “things in themselves” 
or reality, Ricoeur still views metaphor as one of our best vehicles for enriching our 
expression and perception.  Although he focuses on how metaphor redescribes reality, 
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he stresses that its role is more hermeneutic than ontological, i.e., metaphor interprets, 
not makes, reality.  The creative function of metaphor pertains to its impact on changing 
our perception.  As Ricoeur says (1978), the purpose of metaphor “is neither to improve 
communication nor to insure univocal argumentation, but to shatter and to increase our 
sense of reality by shattering and increasing our language.” A new metaphor is like a 
new, distortive panel of glass in the corridor of language which alters how we focus on 
the landscape that it frames.  At various points, Ricoeur even hints at how metaphor can 
convey an entire Weltanschauung, viewing metaphor as a work in miniature. Ricoeur 
(1981) sees indirect and polysemic language not only as ‘always already there’ for 
speakers but also as an ineluctable mediator of social reality. He states: If it is true that 
images which a social group forms of itself are interpretations which belong 
immediately to the constitution of the social bond, if, in other words, the social bond is 
itself symbolic, then it is absolutely futile to seek to derive the images from something 
prior which would be reality, real activity, the process of real life, of which there would 
be secondary reflections and echoes. 
Ricoeur makes this point while discussing ideology, not symbol or 
metaphor.  According to Hübler (2007), a concept is identified by a name or a symbol 
and contains the following items: an objective; a definition; a collection of examples; a 
collection of typical applications; and a list of related concepts. Moreover, the preceding 
quote is followed by the statement that, a non-ideological discourse on ideology here 
comes up against the impossibility of reaching a social reality prior to symbolization. 
Social reality, as “always already” symbolized, is mediated not only by polysemic 
language but also through ideologically-charged discourse.  It is the classic view of 
Marxism’s ideology critique that to the extent that class bias permeates language 
distorted communication results.  Ricoeur, of course, concedes the link between the 
images a social group forms of itself and the class bias of that social group.  This 
concession, along with the preceding quote, would seem to imply that not only is 
language allusive but also it is ideological.  Moreover, while this view of the ideological 
character of language avoids a naive equation of creative speech with authentic speech, 
it throws the polysemic character of language into a different light and introduces a 
tension between what Ricoeur says about metaphor and ideology. For Ricoeur, both 
metaphor and ideology exploit polisemies, although he makes these points separately 
and does not pursue their joint effect for his theory of creativity. Of course, one can 
experiment with ideologies and the various foci they facilitate.   Hence, it would seem 
that ideology, like metaphor, can be compared to distorting glass panels.  Moreover, all 
layered language is a product of metaphorical expansion of polysemy; even it is a 
product of ideological expansion of polysemy as well.  These considerations could lead 
one to ask whether metaphor and ideology (instead of authenticity) are to be equated. 
Once one sees semiology as ideology, the temptation arises to equate ideology with 
domination.  Of course, Marxists from Volosinov to Habermas would agree; they could 
even be correct. A theory of linguistic creativity which includes a comparative analysis 
of metaphor and ideology can avoid these pitfalls.  Moreover, viewing a metaphor or an 
ideology as a “panel of glass” allows, as well, for comparison of their impact on 
perception, i.e., on their differing affects on our focus.  
Linguistic/language ideologies have been defined as "sets of beliefs about language 
articulated by users as a rationalization or justification of perceived language structure 
and use" (Woolard and. Schieffelin, 1994). With a greater social emphasis "self-evident 
ideas and objectives a group holds concerning roles of language in the social 
experiences of members as they contribute to the expression of the group" and "the 
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cultural system of ideas about social and linguistic relationships, together with their 
loading of moral and political interests"; and most broadly as shared bodies of 
commonsense notions about the nature of language in the world. The basic division in 
studies of ideology is between neutral and critical values of the term. The former 
usually encompasses all cultural systems of representation; the latter is reserved for only 
some aspects of representation and social cognition, with particular social origins or 
functional or formal characteristics. The identification of a language with a people has 
been given the most attention (Fishman, 1989; Hymes, 1984; Urban, 1991). It is a 
truism that the equation of language and nation is a historical, ideological construct 
(Coulmas, 1989; de Certau et al., 1984; Grillo, 1989; Handler, 1989; Mackey, 1991), 
conventionally dated to Herder and eighteenth century German romanticism, although 
the famous characterization of language as the genius of a people can be traced to the 
French Enlightenment and specifically Condillac (Aarsleff, 1982; Koepke, 
1990;Olender, 1992). The equation of one language/one people1, the Western insistence 
on the authenticity and moral significance of the mother tongue, and associated 
assumptions about the importance of purist language loyalty for the maintenance of 
minority languages have all been criticized as ideological red herrings, particularly in 
settings where multilingualism is more typical and where a fluid or complex linguistic 
repertoire is valued (Attimasi, 1983; Khubchandani, 1983; Le Page, 1988; MaDonald, 
1989;,Skutnabb-Kangas and Phillipson, 1989). Modern linguistic theory itself has been 
seen as framed and constrained by the one language/one people assumption. Although 
the validity of the nationalist ideology of language has often been debated or debunked, 
less attention traditionally has been given to understanding how the view of language as 
symbolic of self and community has taken hold in so many different settings. Where 
linguistic variation appears to be simply a diagram of social differentiation, the analyst 
needs to identify the ideological production of that diagram (Irvine, 1989). Recent 
studies of language politics have begun to examine specifically the content and 
signifying structure of nationalist language ideologies (Silverstein, 1987; Sontag and 
Pool, 1987; Woolard, 1989). 
Language varieties that are regularly associated with (and thus index) particular 
speakers are often revalued (or misrecognized) not just as symbols of group identity, but 
as emblems of political allegiance or of social, intellectual, or moral worth. Although 
the extensive body of research on linguistic prestige and language attitudes grew up in a 
social psychological framework (Giles et al., 1987), the intrapersonal attitude can be 
recast as a socially-derived intellectualized or behavioral ideology (Bourdieu’s habitus) 
(Bourdieu, 1991;  García and Evangelista, 1988;, Gross, 1983; Woolard, 1985, 1989a,b; 
Woolard and Gahng, 1990). Such meanings affect patterns of language acquisition, 
style-switching, shift, change, and policy. Moreover, symbolic revalorization often 
makes discrimination on linguistic grounds publicly acceptable, whereas the 
corresponding ethnic or racial discrimination is not (Leibowitz, 1976; Messick, 1993). 
However, simply asserting that struggles over language are really about racism does not 
constitute analysis. Such a tearing aside of the curtain of mystification in a "Wizard of 
Oz theory of ideology" (Asad, 1979) begs the question of how and why language comes 
to stand for social groups in a manner that is socially both comprehensible and 
1 The actual problem of Catalan separatism is based precisely on this fact: one language, one people, one 
nation. No matter that there are centuries of common history, similar or equal customs, etc. Myths that 
contradict real historical figures have been falsified and have even come to invent the Catalan identity of 
Cervantes, the great writer of Don Quixote. It is a clear example of the ideological use of language. 
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acceptable. The current program of research is to address both the semiotic and the 
social process. Communities not only evaluate but may appropriate some part of the 
linguistic resources of groups with who they are in contact and in tension, refiguring 
and incorporating linguistic structures in ways that reveal linguistic and social 
ideologies. Linguistic ideology is not a predictable, automatic reflex of the social 
experience of multilingualism in which it is rooted; it makes its own contribution as an 
interpretive filter in the relationship of language and society. The failure to transmit 
vernaculars intergenerationally may be rationalized in various ways, depending on how 
speakers conceptualize the links of language, cognition, and social life. 
Beliefs about what is or is not a real language, and underlying these beliefs, the notion 
that there are distinctly identifiable languages that can be isolated, named, and counted, 
enter into strategies of social domination. Such beliefs, and related schemata for ranking 
languages as more or less evolved, have contributed to profound decisions about, for 
example, the civility or even the humanity of subjects of colonial domination. They also 
quality or disqualify speech varieties from certain institutional uses and their speakers 
from access to domains of privilege (Bourdieu, 1991; Davies, 1984; Gumperz, 1982; 
Labov, 1982). Grammatical variability and. the question of whether a variety has a 
grammar play an important part (Eckert, 1983). The extension of the notion grammar 
from the explicitly artifactual product of scholarly intervention to an abstract underlying 
system has done nothing to mute the polemics. 
Even the syntactic structure of ideological language can evoke a set of mythic beliefs, 
perhaps in even more subtle and powerful fashion than metonymy or metaphor. When 
politicians and government officials appeal for public support for policies or candidates, 
the form of their statements conveys the message that public opinion is influential, and 
it does so for those who accept the particular appeal and for those who do not, 
regardless of the content of the statement. If an appeal for support is made, then support 
obviously counts. Language also conveys a reassuring message regardless of its content. 
Because the language of statutes, constitutions and treaties consists of definitions and of 
specific commands to judges, administrative officials and the general public to behave 
in ways specified by elected representatives of the people, its very form reassures 
popular sovereignty and the rule of law. Lawyers take the ambiguity of legal language 
for granted in their practice, constantly disputing the meaning of terms. To the general 
public, legal language symbolizes precision and clarity in specifying the will of 
legislatures and constitutional conventions.  
The model of Quillian2 is governed by a limitless semiosis, that is to say, each lexeme, 
sooner or later, acquires connections with another one, and each substitution has to 
2 The model of Quillian or model of limitless semiosis (Quillian, 1968) is based reciprocally on a series of 
nodes connected by different types from associative vehicles. For each meaning of a lexeme, a node must 
exist anticipating the term that it is to define. The definition of a type X1 anticipates the use of a series of 
different significants, as their interpretants, receiving the name of tokens (Peirce, 1931-1935) being 
lexemes. The configuration of the lexemes’ meaning comes given by multiplicity of bonds with different 
tokens, each one of which becomes type X2, from where it creates a new configuration including as 
tokens many others lexemes, some from which were lexemes of the type X1. The complete structure will 
have to form an enormous aggregation of ramifications in which each sign will be defined by another sign 
and each sign will become interpretant or interpreted of other signs. From any sign adopted as a central 
type is possible to get to cross all the universes of cultural units, each one of which can be the centre and 
generate infinite peripheries. This model tries to be a class of pluridimensional network, equipped with 
topological properties, in which the routes are extended and shortened and where each term comes near to 
the others through short cuts and direct contacts, remaining simultaneously tie to the others by flexible 
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depend on a connection that the code anticipates. Of course, connections can be created 
about which nobody has thought.  In this case, we have an ambiguous message. The 
aesthetic function of the language tends to create new connections, and therefore, to 
enrich the possibilities of the code. Because of the importance this has with respect to 
belief systems and ideologies, we are going to study four rhetorical figures: metonymy, 
metaphor, parable and analogy.  Rhetorical figures can be explained using the Quillian 
model. Both rhetorical figures can be explained as two forms of operational substitution 
operating on paradigmatic or sintagmatic axes. Through metaphor, metonymy and 
syntax, linguistic references evoke mythic cognitive structures in people's minds. This is 
hardly surprising, for ambiguous situations that concern us are naturally defined by 
focusing on one part of them or by comparing them with what is familiar. 
 
3. RHETORICAL FIGURES 
 
In the Deontical Impure Systems (DIS)3 approach i.e. human society, the Superstructure 
has been divided in two (Usó-Domènech et al. 2009a,b; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-
Doménech, 2013a,b,c,d,e; Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2013; Usó-Domènech 
and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012):  
 
1) The Doxical Superstructure (DS) is formed by values in fact, political and 
religious ideologies and culture of a human society in a certain historical time.   
2) The Mythical Superstructure (MS) also has been divided in two parts:  
a) MS1 containing the mythical components or primogenial bases of the 
ideologies and cultures with the ideal values. 
b) MS2 containing ideal values and utopias that are the ideally wished and 
unattainable goals of belief systems of the Doxical Superstructure (DS).   
relations. Nevertheless, in fact, a graph does not exist representing the model in all its complexity. 
Quillian admits that the nodes representing specific words can be augmented with new research data. It is 
a model of linguistic creativity. In addition, it gives a comprehensive image of the discussions of 
Wittgenstein on meaning as a continuous superposition of correlations (Wittgenstein, 1953). 
3 Impure sets (Maddy, 1990) are sets whose referential elements (absolute beings) are not counted as 
abstract objects and have the following conditions: a) They are real (material or energetic absolute 
beings). b) They exist independently of the Subject. c) S develops p-significances on them. d) True things 
can be said about them. e) Subject can know these true things about them. f) They have properties that 
support a robust notion of mathematical truth. A simple impure system-linkage Σ≡ (M, R) is a semiotic 
system consisting of the pair formed by an impure object set M the elements of which are p-significances 
(relative beings) of entities belonging to Reality (absolute beings) or certain attributes of these, and a set 
of binary relations, such that R ⊂ P(MxM) =  P(M2). That is∀r ∈ R/r ⊂ MxM being  
( ){ }, ,i j i jr x x MxM x x M= ∈ ∈ . An impure system-linkage defined within an impure object set M is 
a simple system S = (M, R) or a finite union of simple systems-linkage Σ = ∪ni=1 Σ i such that Σ i are 
simple systems.  This shall be denoted as Σ ≡ (M, R) such that R ⊂ P(∪finiteM2). A Deontical system is an 
organization of knowledge on the part of the subject S that fulfils the following conditions:  a) Other 
subjects (human beings) are elements of the system. b) Some existing relations between elements have 
Deontic modalities.  c) There is purpose (purposes).   
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These ideas are summarized in the following diagram (Figure 1): 
 
Figure 1: DIS approach. Structural base and superstructures. 
 
Let jiρ be a connotative chain4. Index i expresses a connotative chain and supraindex j 
expresses a connotative chain after passing through a certain doxical filter. Let L be a 
language. The experience of the individuals or social groups moves in a double domain; 
all of this is articulated linguistically by mediation of a set of the connotative chains Ρ= 
{ } mj niji ,...,1,....1==ρ , and can, at any moment, be represented less than adequately by the invoked 
significants, to be translated to an organizing language. Language L is surpassed always 
4 Connotation is the sum of all the cultural units that the significant can evoke institutionally in the mind 
of the addressee Subject whose only psychic possibility is cultural availability. The connotation of socio-
cultural and individual associations, are the ideologies derived from the belief systems, and the emotional 
ones belonging to the psychology of the Subject, and that is the indirect function of the Semiotic 
Environment (context) in which is immersed. The B-significant (B-ם), second order significant or 
connotation is the significant of significance s.  Changes in the form of the significant ם can generate 
different connotations. The sequence of connotations is a chain of connotations o connotative chain 
(Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech. 2013a,b,d,e).  
 
Doxical Superstructure 
 (DS) 
Values in fact, Dominant Ideology, 
Culture: Science, Art, Folk beliefs, etc.
Primigenial Base (PB) 
 Ideal Values, Myths.
connotative-SB- projection 
(materialization)Subject
mythical superstructural 
image (MS-image)
Ideal Structure (ISt) 
  Ideal Values, Utopia (Goals)
doxical superstructural 
image (denotative-DS-image). 
denotative-MS-projection
Mythical Superstructure (MS)
Structural Base
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and the possibility of a linguistic structuring is outlined permanently. This exteriority is 
real; the individual is in front of diverse sublanguages Li ⊂  L, formed by the different 
connotative chains that occur in the crucible of his experience and so that jiρ ∈Li. 
These sublanguages Li are supported by social groups, associations, and individuals that 
update them with their behaviors, giving a social dimension assuring its coherence and 
permanence. Therefore, all social experience is located inside a semantic field of 
connotative significances. By definition, it can never correspond to the language L, 
which includes it. The individual finds a sublanguage Li constituted so that it seems apt 
to translate all the sense of his history; it enriches him with specific details of his 
existence, but at the same time, this existence loses its chaotic sense, is ordered, and 
completed in an intelligible place with other human lives. Community and difference 
overlap closely. In addition, suddenly, this dissymmetric and heterogeneous 
environment is reconstructed. Sublanguage Li explains, gives a sense, and fixes the 
identity of the condition. By this only fact, it is validated and reassumed in its 
generality. The encounter with the sublanguage Li is a rare time theoretically or 
abstractly. It happens through an individual mediation that is a conscious vehicle and 
that is incarnate in his existence. They appear as unified forms with which the others 
could identify. Peculiarly, they are the true connotative significances for this one 
sublanguage. The contingency of the encounter is not for that reason less evident. 
Moreover, although it is contingent, this encounter does not let have irreversible effects.  
The individual is marked by the sublanguage Li that has totalized his experience; here 
significance is pronounced as the quasi-biological incidence of the connotative 
significances on the human being. The better proof is the fact that sometimes another 
sublanguage Lj cannot be sufficient.  Nevertheless, how are sublanguages selected?  By 
mediation of a technique of persuasion defined as Rhetoric.  Ideological rhetoric and 
action comprise an elaborate dialectical structure, reflecting the beliefs, tensions and 
ambivalences that flow from social inequality and conflicting interests.  
For our intentions we are going to define some of the more important rhetorical figures 
and then they are widely used in the ideological discourse having the objective to 
transmit the ideology, assuring its permanence and diffusion (Beekman and 
Callow,1974; Corbett, 1971; Lakoff and Johnson, 1980; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-
Doménech, 2013a,b,c,d; Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012) 
 
3.1. Metonymy 
Metonymy is a figure of speech in which a thing, concept, person, or group is 
represented by something closely associated with it. Metonymy is often contrasted with 
metaphor. Metonymy is characterized by association, whereas metaphor establishes a 
relationship of similarity. Thus referring to a king as the throne is an instance of 
metonymy. Referring to the king as a lion is an instance of metaphor. A conventional 
metonymy is a metonymy that is commonly used in everyday language in a culture to 
give structure to some portion of that culture’s conceptual system. 
Let isc −  and jsc − be two connotations (cultural units). We denote as μ the relation of 
metonymy and isc − μ jsc −  we will say that isc −  is metonymically related to jsc −
or jsc −  is a metonymy of isc − .  The metonymy has the following properties: 
 
a) Reflexive property: isc − μ isc − . Every connotation is metonymy of itself.   
b) Symmetrical property: isc − μ jsc −  = jsc − μ isc − . 
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c) Transitive property: If isc − μ jsc −  and jsc − μ ksc −  then isc − μ ksc −  
 
We are to define the operation of Metonymic substitution. In the common practice of the 
language, proximities have been verified on the sintagmatic axis. Let isc − and jsc −  
be two lexemes. We define an operation of metonymic substitution, denoted by (μS), and 
so that isc − (μS) jsc − → jsc − .  
 
Example 1: Consider the following chain of connotations (figure 2): 
c-s1
c-s2 c-s3
c-s4
c-s5
c-s6
c-s9
SINTAGMATIC AXIS
 
 
Figure 2: Chain of connotations. 
 
In figure 1 we can establish the following metonymic substitutions:   
 
1sc − (μS) 2sc − → 2sc −  
1sc − (μS) 4sc − → 4sc −  
2sc − (μS) 3sc − → 3sc −  
2sc − (μS) 5sc − → 5sc −  
4sc − (μS) 6sc − → 6sc −     
6sc − (μS) 9sc − → 9sc −  . 
 
Then 
 
1sc − (μS) 2sc − → 2sc − (μS) 3sc − → 3sc − ▬▬► 1sc − (μS)2i=1 3sc − → 3sc −  
1sc − (μS) 2sc − → 2sc − (μS) 5sc − → 5sc − ▬▬► 1sc − (μS)2i=1 5sc − → 5sc −  
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1sc − (μS) 4sc − → 4sc − (μS) 6sc − → 6sc − (μS) 9sc − → 9sc − ▬▬► 1sc − (μS)3i=1 9sc −  
 
Generalizing  
isc − (μS)mi=1 jsc − → jsc −  
m being the number of existing semantic connections of substitution between isc −  and 
isc − in the model of Quillian.   
Let 0sc −  be a connotative significance of null meaning. Metonymic substitution has 
the following properties:  
 
1) Commutative property: ( isc − (μS) jj scsc −→− )=( jsc −  (μS) ii scsc −→− ). 
2) It has no Neutral element: ( isc − (μS) 00 scsc −→− ) ≠ ( 0sc − (μS) ii scsc −→− ). 
3) Associative property:  
( isc − (μS) jj scsc −→− )(μS)[( ksc − (μS) ll scsc −→− )(μS)( msc − (μS nn scsc −→−
)]=[( isc − (μS) jj scsc −→− )(μS)( ksc − (צ) ll scsc −→− )](μS)( msc − (μS)
nn scsc −→− ) 
 
We are to define the operation of double metonymic substitution. 
Let ji scsc −− ,  be two connotative significances fulfilling the condition of metonymy 
so that isc − μ jsc − . Let 
** , ji scsc −−  be its two equivalents in a different context and 
so that ** jjii scscscsc −≡−∧−≡−  and so that 
*
isc − μ
*
jsc − . We will designate by 
(צ)↔ the operation of double metonymic substitution.  
 
Theorem 1: jsc − (μS)↔
*
isc −  
 
Proof: 
 
By the symmetrical property of the metonymic relation, we may establish that:   
isc − (μS) jsc −  ∧ jsc − (μS) isc −  
*
isc − (μS)
*
jsc −  ∧
*
jsc − (μS)
*
isc −  
If 
[( jsc − (μS) isc − )∧ ( )*ii scsc −≡− ] → jsc − (μS) *isc −  
[( *isc − (μS)
*
jsc − )∧  (
*
jj scsc −≡− )] → 
*
isc − (μS) jsc −  
Therefore jsc − (μS)↔
*
isc −  
 
Theorem 2: isc − (μS)↔
*
isc −  
 
Proof: 
 
If 
[( *isc − (μS)
*
jsc − )∧ ( jsc −  (μS) isc − )] → (
*
isc − (μS) isc − ) 
then 
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[( *isc − (μS) isc − )∧ (
*
ii scsc −≡− )] → isc − (μS)↔
*
isc −  
 
We are to define the operation of Multiple Metonymic Substitution. 
Let nji scscsc −−− ,...,,  be n connotative significances fulfilling the condition of 
metonymy so that: 
 isc − μ jsc − … isc − μ nsc − , jsc − μ ksc − .., jsc − μ nsc − … 1−− nsc μ nsc − .   
Let ** , ji scsc −− ,…,
*
nsc −  be its equivalents in a different context and so that 
( ) ( ) ( )*** ... nnjjii scscscscscsc −≡−∧∧−≡−∧−≡−  and so that:  
*
isc − μ
*
jsc − ,…,
*
isc − μ
*
nsc − ,
*
jsc − μ
*
ksc − ..,
*
jsc − μ
*
nsc − …
*
1−− nsc μ
*
nsc − .   
 
Theorem 3: 
 ( jsc − (μS)↔
*
isc − )∧…∧ ( nsc − (μS)↔
*
isc − ),( isc − (μS)↔
*
jsc − )∧…∧  ( nsc − (μS)↔
*
jsc − ) ∧…∧ ( isc − (μS)↔
*
nsc − ) ∧…∧ ( 1−− nsc (μS)↔
*
nsc − ) 
 
Proof: 
 
By the symmetrical property of the metonymic relation, we may establish that:   
isc − (μS) jsc −  ∧ jsc − (μS) isc − ,…, isc − (μS) nsc −  ∧ nsc − (μS) isc −  
jsc − (μS) ksc −  ∧ ksc − (μS) jsc − ,…, jsc − (μS) nsc −  ∧ nsc − (μS) jsc −  
………………………………………………………………………. 
nsc − (μS) 1−− nsc  ∧ 1−− nsc (μS) nsc −   
and 
*
isc − (μS)
*
jsc − ∧
*
jsc −  (μS)
*
isc − ,…., 
*
isc − (μS)
*
nsc −  ∧
*
nsc − (μS)
*
isc −  
*
jsc − (μS)
*
ksc −  ∧
*
ksc − (μS)
*
jsc − ,…, 
*
jsc − (μS)
*
nsc −  ∧
*
nsc − (μS)
*
jsc −  
………………………………………………………………………. 
*
nsc − (μS)
*
1−− nsc  ∧
*
1−− nsc (μS)
*
nsc −  
If 
[( jsc − (μS) isc − )∧ ( )*ii scsc −≡− ] → jsc − (μS) *isc −  
……………………………………………………….. 
[( nsc − (μS) isc − )∧ ( )*ii scsc −≡− ] → nsc − (μS) *isc −  
[( ksc − (μS) jsc − )∧ ( )*jj scsc −≡− ] → ksc − (μS) *jsc −  
……………………………………………………….. 
[( nsc − (μS) jsc − )∧ ( )*jj scsc −≡− ] → nsc − (μS) *jsc −  
……………………………………………………….. 
[( nsc − (μS) 1−− nsc )∧ ( )* 11 −− −≡− nn scsc ] → nsc − (μS) * 1−− nsc  
and 
[( *isc − (μS)
*
jsc − )∧  (
*
jj scsc −≡− )] → 
*
isc − (μS) jsc −  
therefore 
( jsc − (μS)↔
*
isc − )∧…∧ ( nsc − (μS)↔
*
isc − ),( isc − (μS)↔
*
jsc − )∧…∧  ( nsc − ((μS)↔
*
jsc − ) ∧…∧ ( isc − (μS)↔
*
nsc − ) ∧…∧ ( 1−− nsc (μS)↔
*
nsc − ) 
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Theorem 4: isc − (μS)↔
*
isc − ,..., isc − (μS)↔
*
nsc − , jsc − (μS)↔
*
jsc − ,…., jsc − (μS)↔
*
nsc − ,…., nsc − (μS)↔
*
nsc −  
 
Proof: 
 
If 
[( *isc − (μS)
*
jsc − )∧ ( jsc −  (μS) isc − )] → (
*
isc − (μS) isc − )                (a) 
…………………………………………………………… 
[( *isc − (μS)
*
nsc − )∧ ( nsc −  (μS) isc − )] → (
*
nsc − (μS) isc − )                (b) 
[( *jsc − (μS)
*
ksc − )∧ ( ksc −  (μS) jsc − )] → (
*
ksc − (μS) jsc − )               (c) 
…………………………………………………………… 
[( *jsc − (μS)
*
nsc − )∧ ( nsc −  (μS) jsc − )] → (
*
nsc − (μS) jsc − )               (d) 
…………………………………………………………… 
[( * 1−− nsc (μS)
*
nsc − )∧ ( 1−− nsc  (μS) nsc − )] → (
*
1−− nsc (μS) 1−− nsc )      (e) 
then of 
(a) ⇒ [( *isc − (μS) isc − )∧ (
*
ii scsc −≡− )] therefore isc − (μS)↔
*
isc −  
(b) ⇒ [( *isc − (μS) nsc − )∧ (
*
nn scsc −≡− )] therefore isc − (μS)↔
*
nsc −  
(c) ⇒ [( *jsc − (μS) jsc − )∧ (
*
kk scsc −≡− )] therefore jsc − (μS)↔
*
ksc −  
(d) ⇒ [( *jsc − (μS) nsc − )∧ (
*
nn scsc −≡− )] therefore jsc − (μS)↔
*
nsc −  
(e) ⇒ [( * 1−− nsc (μS) nsc − )∧ (
*
11 −− −≡− nn scsc )] therefore nsc − (μS)↔
*
nsc −  
 
Multiple metonymic substitutions are essential to understand mathematically the 
ideological transmission through messages of advertising type. Any reader of publicity 
understands this process developed in theorems 3 and 4 with no need to be involved in 
such a laborious analysis.  
 
3.2. Metaphor 
A metaphor is the expression of an understanding of one concept in terms of another 
concept, where there is some similarity or correlation between the two or understanding 
of one concept in terms of another. Metaphor is a word used in an unfamiliar context to 
give us a new insight; a good metaphor moves us to see our ordinary world in an 
extraordinary way. For example: My salad days, When I was green in judgment. 
(Shakespeare).  
Metaphors and symbols are better means to communicate than explicit discursive non-
symbolic language.  Thinking entirely symbolically is not effective either.  A 'mature' 
thinker uses both, and so does a 'mature' civilization.  Symbol differs from metaphor in 
that it need not contain a comparison. A symbol is an object or event that, by virtue of 
association, represents something more or something other than the referent. Using 
symbols is not a sign of regression. We use symbols and metaphors to explain 
things.  They are our best method of thinking creatively.  They are much more effective 
means of communication than discursive non symbolic language.  The symbol and the 
metaphor are like the egg of the phoenix.  A symbol dies when it ceases to inspire and 
create an emotional response from those who encounter it.  But a symbol can rise up 
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from the ashes of its so-called death and be re-born into new meaning.  That is its 
power. Symbols and metaphors are part of the unconscious language.  Jung and 
Giegerich are correct.  But, this is not primitive in a historic sense. Metaphors and 
symbols are primitive in the sense of being part of the thought processes that we 
developed prior to the more formal systems of logical and analysis, that non-symbolic 
discursive language. We cannot think new thoughts or ideas without symbols and 
metaphors.  When we are inspired to make use of symbols and/or a metaphors it is an 
example of our unconscious thought processes trying to communicate with our 
conscious mind. Sometimes the ideological appeal of a symbol is stronger than the 
observable conditions in which people live. One study has noted, for example, that 
welfare recipients almost always refer to other recipients as "they" rather than "we"; and 
that a majority of people on welfare favour midnight searches of the homes of welfare 
recipients and require budget counselling. These people ignore their own experiences 
and focus upon a mythical population of welfare parasites created by the language of 
their political adversaries. Fortunately, such symbolic devices are not omnipotent. 
People often resist them when they run counter to their self-evident or perceived 
interests, but many do not. 
What is at issue, of course, is not just metaphor as a useful (or even a necessary) means 
of communicating something we already know. This would be allegory, not metaphor. 
Rather metaphor is a way of knowing, not just a way of communicating. In metaphor 
knowledge and its expression are one and the same; there is no way around the 
metaphor, it is not expendable.  
Metaphor is equally effective and probably even more common in the linguistic 
evocation of ideological myths. The eminent psychologist Theodore Sarbin (1994) has 
suggested that when Teresa of Avila referred, in the seventeenth century, to the 
problems of emotionally disturbed people as being like an illness, she used a metaphor 
which ultimately became a myth. In view of anthropological evidence that cultures 
differ greatly in what they define as mental abnormality and other studies demonstrating 
the social basis of such labelling, many social scientists, including Sarbin, believe that 
the judgment involved in calling someone "schizophrenic" is basically moral, not 
medical. Yet the metaphor of mental illness has become a myth widely accepted by 
laymen and conventional psychiatrists. It is used every day to deny freedom and dignity 
to people who already suffer from too little of either, and it is often used to enforce 
conformity to middle-class norms in the United States and to Communist party norms in 
China. Sarbin suggests that such movement from metaphor to myth is a common social 
phenomenon; it is especially common as a political phenomenon as well. 
We denote as Μ the relation of metaphor and isc −  Μ jsc −  we will say that isc −  is 
metaphorically related to jsc − or jsc −  is a metaphor of isc − . Metaphor has the 
following properties:  
 
a) Reflexive property: isc − Μ isc − . Every connotation is metaphor of 
itself.   
b) Antisymmetrical property: isc − Μ jsc −  ≠ jsc − Μ isc − . 
c) Transitive property: If isc − Μ jsc −  and jsc − Μ ksc −  then isc − Μ
ksc −  
Then, metaphorical relation is an order relation. 
We define the operation of metaphoric substitution. 
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Let ρi be a connotative chain and ijsc −  be connotative significances (Nescolarde-Selva 
and Usó-Doménech, 2013a,b; Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012). We are 
going to establish the following rule of substitution: any connotative significance can be 
replaced by another one, that belongs or not to the same connotative chain. We will 
denominate (ΜS) to the operation of metaphoric substitution and so that kisc − (ΜS)
l
j
l
j scsc −→−  and that we can read 
l
jsc −  has metaphorically replaced 
k
isc −  or 
l
jsc −  
is a metaphor of kisc − . 
 
a) Simple metaphors 
 
1) Substitution by primary antonymy: 11sc −  (ΜS) 
2
1sc −  →
2
1sc −  
2) Substitution by secondary antonymy: 11sc −  (ΜS) 
2
2sc −  →
2
2sc −  
3) Substitution by n-th antonym: 11sc −  (ΜS) 
2
nsc −  →
2
nsc −  
4) Substitution by obvious connotation: 11sc − (ΜS) 
1
nsc −  →
1
nsc −  
 
b) Mediate metaphors 
 
5) Substitution by sharpness: 11sc − (ΜS)
n
nsc −  → 
n
nsc −  
 
And so on.  
Any type of previously defined metaphor can be created by the operation of metaphoric 
substitution.  It is enough that lexemes exist or are introduced in the code.   
Let us suppose that in language L there is a habitual practice in which 11sc −  is replaced 
by 21sc − .  This case 
2
1sc − becomes by convention in the one of the possible 
connotations of // 11sc − . Substitution by antonymy, when a habit enters into the code 
and in the end it fossilizes as a catachresis. Metaphorical substitution takes place by the 
fact that in the code connections exist, and therefore, proximity.   
Metaphoric substitution has the following properties: 
 
1) Metaphoric substitution has not commutative properties: kisc − (ΜS)
≠−→− lj
l
j scsc  
k
jsc − (ΜS)
l
i
l
i scsc −→− . 
2) Multiple substitution: If kisc − (ΜS)
l
j
l
j scsc −→−  and 
k
jsc − (ΜS)
l
n
l
m scsc −→−  then 
k
isc − (ΜS)
l
n
l
m scsc −→− . 
 
Any symbolic representation of reality can be considered as a text T.  Logically a text 
can be divided in subtexts, such as .TTi ⊆  simultaneously, each subtext can be divided 
in smaller units, arriving at the word (or an elementary sign) level that would be the 
primitive text.   
Let T1 and T2 be two texts and T1* be a subtext of T1, such as .1
*
1 TT ⊆  We define as 
≡
cesignifican
 the operation of semantic resemblance and ≈
cesignifican
the operation of semantic 
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equality such as T1 ≈
cesignifican
T2 such that T2 is used to enhance the meaning associated 
with T1.  
 
Axiom 1: The operation of semantic equality is a suboperation of semantic 
resemblance. 
 
Definition 1: Metaphor is when we say T1 ≈
cesignifican
T2.  
 
3.3. The Parable  
A parable is a brief allegory that is used to teach a moral lesson. A parable is a metaphor 
that has been extended to form a brief, coherent fiction. Parables are stories, of course, 
but of a particular kind -- stories that set the familiar in an unfamiliar context, which is 
also, what a metaphor does. Parables are not used by religious ideologies solely. 
Different kinds of policy assumptions are based on distinct political beliefs and their 
often-implicit philosophical traditions, and these “political parables of citizenship and 
personhood” provoke different kinds of political activism. 
We denote as Ρ the relation of parable and isc − Ρ jsc −  we will say that isc −  is 
parabletically related to jsc − or isc − is a parable of jsc − .  In this case jsc −  always 
explains or interprets isc − .  
The properties of parabletical relation are: 
 
a) Reflexive property: isc − Ρ isc − . Every connotation is parable of itself.   
b) Antisymmetrical property: isc − Ρ jsc −  ≠ jsc − Ρ isc − . 
c) Transitive property: If isc − Ρ jsc −  and jsc − Ρ ksc −  then isc − Ρ
ksc −  
 
The transitive property indicates the possibility of chained parables as in the case of 
Ignacy5 Krasicki (Milosz, 1983).  Then, parabletical relation is an order relation. 
 
3.4. The Analogy 
In preceding works, we established the deontical modalities: obligation, prohibition, 
permission and faculty. Nevertheless, a Deontical Impure System (Nescolarde-Selva et 
al, 2012a,b,; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-Doménech, 2012; Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-
Doménech, 2013a,b,e; Usó-Doménech, and Nescolarde-Selva 2013; Usó-Doménech and 
Nescolarde-Selva, 2012), presents five modalities in many of their relations. Analogy 
and allegory are essential in the understanding of the transmission conservation and 
materialization of the belief systems and ideologies, belonging to the Doxical 
Superstructure (IDS). The fundamental question in this ongoing debate is, how do we 
know an analogy really exists? Analogy as a procedure of unification and arrangement 
5 Parables are chained, as for example, when Matthew 13 puts together the Treasure, the Pearl, and the 
Fishnet; or when Luke 15 chains the Lost Sheep and the Lost coin with the Lost (Prodigal) Son. In the 
chains Gospel writers have recast parables in a parallel style in order to indicate similar meaning. 
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continuously appears in myth, art and poetry.  Its presence always exposes a spiritual 
force (mystical) in action, the necessity to reunite what is dispersed.   
There is an asymmetry of metaphorical statements. As metaphors, analogies are always 
asymmetrical. The primary purpose of analogy, in most cases, is to compare a lesser-
known domain with a better-known one. This allows one to carry structure from the 
better-known domain over to the lesser-known domain, in the form of inferences, to 
produce more knowledge about it. This sort of directional production of inferences is 
what produces the asymmetry in metaphors as well. In metaphor, the vehicle 
corresponds to the better-known domain, and the topic to the lesser-known, and 
inferences are produced from the vehicle to the topic. The "Aquinas was a midwife" 
metaphor demonstrates this. The inferences about internal development are carried from 
the vehicle to the topic, and no inferences are made in the other direction. 
 
Definition 2: An analogy is a figure of speech in which there is a likeness in one or 
more ways between things unlike otherwise.  
 
Definition 3: An analogy is when 1
*
1 TT ⊆ / ≡
cesignifican
T *1  T2. 
 
In analogy there is no replacement, only aspectual comparison, and implied in this is 
that if T1 ≈
cesignifican
T2 in certain states, there is a chance that other similar states will also 
be found. The analogy has the following characteristic: 
 
Definition 4 (Principle of sufficient identification):  There is a relative assimilation 
between objects, not by their values, but by the sense of their situations, since it only 
concerns the dynamic position, is to say the symbolic position of the objects, and it is 
considered the nucleus of the symbolic action.   
 
It is comprehensible that identification is sufficient from the moment at which it takes 
place exactly in the symbolic tension. Two objects, essentially the same and with 
similar functions, but that are existentially different, become an interchangeable 
symbolic unit. While agreeing in their functions, with the same properties, both objects 
that existentially are different, become a unit in the symbol and are interchangeable. The 
symbolic image is not an "example" (an external and possible relation between two 
objects or connections), but an internal analogy (a necessary and constant relation).   
To infer the analogy underlying somebody's thinking from the metaphors used in their 
speech is chancy; sometimes one set of metaphors is conventionalized for a given topic, 
but people can, on command, rapidly switch to a different set of metaphors to express 
the same ideas about the same topic. The structure mapping theory of metaphor treats 
metaphors as analogies, at least in their underlying cognitive mechanisms. Some 
metaphors are obviously similar to analogies, and may even be considered analogies. 
However, structure mapping theory can handle similarity comparisons and metaphors 
that only involve the mapping of attributes. On the surface, the existence of these two 
different types of metaphor seems to make the possibility of a general theory of 
metaphor that treats metaphor as analogy impossible. However, it turns out that literal 
similarity comparisons may also involve the same processes as analogies, which means 
that metaphors that function as literal similarity comparisons could also be analogies. 
Yet it is generally the ideas we care about. 
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To distinguish between analogy and metaphor, we note that:  
 
1) When analyzing a metaphor, we then notice aspectual similarities between it and 
a different metaphor and say T1ΜA ≡
cesignifican
T2ΜB; this is analogy, and the 
ability to do this rests on the sharing of the proposed template. Metaphor is as 
analogy. Analogies involve the structural alignment of two (or more) structured 
representations (representations containing objects, their relations, and their 
attributes, along with relations between relations) so that the common elements 
in the representations are mapped onto each other. 
 
2) Systematicity requires that, all things being equal, higher-order mappings are 
preferred. This means that mappings involving relations between relations will 
be preferred to mappings involving relations between objects, and mappings 
between relations between objects will be preferred to mappings between objects 
or their attributes.  
 
3) The one-to-one mapping constraint requires that each element in a 
representation be connected to at most one element in the other domain. For 
instance, in "The atom is as the solar system" analogy, once we map the planets 
in the solar system domain onto electrons in the atom domain, we cannot also 
map the planets onto the nucleus or some other element in the atom domain.  
 
4) Parallel-connectivity requires that when elements are mapped onto each other, 
their arguments are also mapped. For instance, when we map the "Revolve 
around" relation in the "Atom is as the solar system" analogy, then parallel 
connectivity requires that the arguments (planets-sun in the solar system domain, 
and electrons-nucleus in the atom domain) be mapped as well.  
 
Since metaphors resemble both types of comparisons, structure mapping has been used 
as a theory of metaphor.  
 
Theorem 5: A metaphor is a verbal construction, which expresses an analogy.  
 
Proof 
 
Let 21 TT
cesignifican
≈  a metaphor. Since for Axiom 1 ≡≈ ⊂
cesignificancesignifican
 then .21 TT
cesignifican
≡  
 
Theorem 6: An analogy can be expressed non-metaphorically, and metaphors can be 
so confused as to not express any coherent analogy.  
 
Proof 
 
It is trivial. 
 
Conclusion: Metaphors are a special case of analogies.  
 
4.  ALLEGORY 
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An allegory is a story with two meanings, a literal meaning and a symbolic meaning. 
An allegory involves using many interconnected symbols or allegorical figures in such a 
way that nearly every element of the narrative has a meaning beyond the literal level, 
i.e., everything in the narrative is a symbol that relates to other symbols within the story. 
The allegorical story, poem, or play can be read either literally or as a symbolic 
statement about a political, spiritual, or psychological truth. If we wish to be more 
exact, an allegory is an act of interpretation--a way of understanding--rather than a 
genre in and of itself. Poems, novels, or plays can all be allegorical. These can be as 
short as a single sentence or as long as a ten-volume book. The label "allegory" comes 
from an interaction between symbols that creates a coherent meaning beyond that of the 
literal level of interpretation.  A simple description of allegory based on this etymology 
is “to speak otherwise than one seems to speak.”  That is to say that in allegory there are 
two distinct levels on which meaning is being conveyed, the level on which one is 
seeming to speak and the level which is being alluded to by that speech.  The meaning 
to which an author is alluding requires an interpretive effort on the part of the listener, 
as it is not necessarily or immediately revealed.  For this reason, allegory is often 
associated with criticism and exegesis, which seek to expound meanings beyond what is 
evident.  Because allegory can connect what is evident to our senses to an idea that can 
never take physical form, it is useful for connecting images or objects to ideas and 
ideals whose ends would be served by the validation and empirical reality of physical 
evidence, such as liberty, freedom, and justice. A history of the modern use and 
interpretation of allegory is given by Walter Benjamin in his essay The Origin of 
German Tragic Drama (1977), written originally in 1924-25.  After surveying the 
history of allegory, Benjamin concludes that it became more than just an illustrative 
technique during its apotheosis in the Baroque period.  He shows that allegory became a 
“form of expression, just as speech is expression, and indeed, just as writing is. 
Benjamin situates his definition of allegory specifically in the historical contrast 
between classicism and the Baroque. Thus, the historical contrast between the Baroque 
and the classical is echoed in the functional contrast between allegory and the 
symbol.  Walter Benjamin observes that classicism adored the brevity of the symbol, 
which instantaneously linked it with its meaning. Allegory, on the other hand, is 
determined to be less forthcoming.  It indulges the reader in a suspension of time, a step 
into the void that separates the layers of meaning.  Benjamin uses the metaphor of the 
woods versus an abyss to contrast the mystery of the symbolic that absorbs meaning 
into its connection with the distance of allegory that separates visual being from 
meaning. The allegory searches for something outside itself through; the symbol instead 
finds it immediately, demonstrating nothing more than itself, it is just through its self-
evident reason of existence that it carries within itself the essence of the universal. This 
was proposed by Goethe (2007) in his Massime e riflessionie6 who then clarified that 
both the mission of allegory and of the symbol is to connect the peculiar to the 
universal. As symbols attain a cultural life beyond any particular work of the 
imagination, they can become archetypes. Not all conventional symbols would be called 
archetypes. Archetypes are hypothesized as transcendent symbols. As the structure of 
ideas which a set of symbols in an allegory convey through characters and their 
narratives becomes more associated with spiritual and cosmic significance, as well as 
6 Maximen und Reflexionen, 1833 (postumo) 
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with cross cultural patterns of significance, the allegory becomes mythic and archetypal. 
In fact, an entire area of literary criticism tries to uncover the universal or collective 
unconscious patterns of symbol and allegory that lie behind all cultures' narrative and 
artistic production. Sometimes called Archetypical or Jungian Criticism, it is associated 
with major scholars such as Carl Jung, Northrup Frye and Joseph Campbell. According 
to Jung (Jung. and Franz, 1964), the unconscious nature of the symbol is clearly 
enounced. Just as clear is the opposition between symbol and allegory bases itself on the 
dualism of conscious\unconscious. Like the artist also the interpreter unconsciously 
reaches the symbolic depths abandoning his critical vigilance and letting himself be 
carried along by the action of the work (as also in Jung the "mystic" promise of the 
symbol is fulfilled). Taking the opposite direction to that suggested by Goethe, the 
symbolists concentrate on evanescence; the symbol is not to be found in a single 
element, but in a multiplicity, that establishes an atmosphere. In the atmosphere, it is not 
so much the "relation" between the related ideal an a particular and the related ideal, but 
a group of infinitesimal particulars, that contribute to a sense of globality which is an 
unattainable ideal. 
Allegory is a form of extended metaphor in which objects, persons, and actions in a text 
are equated with meanings that lie outside the text itself. Thus, it represents one thing in 
the guise of another, an abstraction of a concrete image. By a process of double 
signification, the order of textual elements represents actions and characters, and they, 
in turn, represent ideas. Allegory often clarifies this process by giving patently 
meaningful names to persons and places. Symbolism and allegory are similarly mixed 
up in too many students' minds. Here's the difference. In common parlance, a parable is 
a story or short narrative designed to reveal allegorically some religious principle, moral 
lesson, psychological reality, or general truth. A distinction between symbol and 
allegory is established. For Jung and Campbell (1976) the allegory is a symbol reduced 
to the category of sign, to the designation of a single one of its serial and dynamic 
possibilities.   
The sign is a semiotic expression, a conventional abbreviation for a well-known thing. 
Then, the allegory is mechanization from symbol, thus its dominant quality is petrified 
and turned into a sign, apparently even animated by traditional symbolic clothes. The 
allegory has often been transformed to total conscienciousnesse for scenographic or 
literary purposes. The elements of the allegory are symbolic and when used, they are 
distinguished from true symbols. Only their function is modified, because instead of 
alluding to Metaphysical and spiritual principles, allegories have been created 
artificially to designate concrete realities. However, the elements of the allegory can 
return to their symbolic state if the subconscious, forgetting their semiotic and merely 
representative purpose, frames them as such. This happens in art; the symbols that were 
ordered in conscious and traditional systems, but their inner flourishes under that 
rationalized arrangement, thus being concealed but ready.   
The allegorical mode dealing with the elements of representation like words in speech, 
empties them of sensitive immediacy. The usual and intuitive link between significant 
and significance is put aside by the hypothesis of a new meaning, and a gap opens 
between the two levels; in this can be found the critical attitude that does not take for 
granted the appearance of the world. The opposition to the symbol is strong: that 
promises to the implied elements salvation, transfiguration and realization, whereas the 
allegory operates in a double direction:  
 
1) It devaluates the images endowed with vital representative plenitude.  
21 
 
 
2) It promotes their rank, restoring to them a significative function, those whose 
prestige has diminished in the course of history.  
 
In allegory the objective referent evoked is without value until it is translated into the 
fixed meaning that has its own particular structure of ideas. In allegory, it seems to me, 
the goal of the work is to bring the reader to that particular structure of ideas, and, in 
that case, the reader who tends to read literally is likely to miss the point entirely. 
The interior essence that the symbol preserves within itself rendering invisible, hiding, 
is projected out of itself externalised, exposing it in things by the allegory. The unit 
symbol, its mystical union corresponds to the fragmentary. The irreparable dissolution 
of reality achieved by allegory that, being a fragment, leaves no lasting appearance of 
reality, and no illusion of regaining the totality.  
To the classical harmony of the symbol is opposed the unbalanced and rebellious nature 
of the allegory that destroys any aura of magic and sense of world totality. Dialecticism, 
concerning the allegory which does not address itself only towards the external, but 
which is also internal and that manifests itself in antitheses and antinomies of a 
Hegelian nature. Such dialecticism therefore, does not provide for any mythical 
narrative or epic itinerary. On the contrary, the myth remains as an appendage of the 
symbol, being an event outside of history. Benjamin (2007), in opposition to Husserl`s 
phenomenology and influenced to a certain extent by Neo-Kantianism, affirms that the 
totality of things appear to the intellect through artistic work in an enigmatic way and 
these enigma are a challenge to philosophy. According to Morowitz (2012), physics is 
the one science where the Kantian epistemological ontological approach has been 
applied. The details are worked out in Margenau`s book, ‘‘The Nature of Physical 
Reality: A Philosophy of Modern Physics” H.Margeneau (1950)’’.  
In light of the above, where the symbol is the holy word, the language of religion is 
identified with all that represents duplicity of meaning, and its contrast to allegory can 
be placed only on an interpretative plane. In this way, therefore we are witnesses of the 
reassumption on the part of allegory, of its previous negative role: that of representation 
and the attempt to definitely restrain the opening up of meanings offered by the symbol.  
It is possible to consider the symbol and allegory as two forms of expression. However, 
one has to separate them and places them in opposition schematically: a) In the symbol, 
the spatial simultaneity of image and substance is recognized. b) In the allegory the 
temporal difference (temporal disjunction) is recognized. In conclusion, we may affirm 
that the symbol and the allegory have to be considered as ways of organization, that is 
to say the tendency that guides the entire textual work.  In the symbol, one finds a return 
of the synthesising element of salvation, in the allegory the cutting analytic dialectic, 
representing life. The one is inexplicable mystery, the other an enigma always ready to 
be reassembled. An object, a setting, or even a character can represent another, more 
general idea. Note, however, that symbols function perfectly well in isolation from other 
symbols as long as the reader already knows their assigned meaning. Allegory, 
however, does not work that way; allegory requires symbols working in conjunction 
with each other. We can ask the following questions:   
 
1) What exactly are symbols and how do they differ from ordinary language and 
other figures of speech?  
 
2) How can we determine if a text invites a symbolic reading?  
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3) How can we distinguish various types of symbols such as personal, 
conventional, cultural, archetypal and allegorical?  
 
Let S be a subject and let ΨΦ, be two sets of symbols having different connotative 
significances. We will represent like c-φ and c-ψ the connotative significances of the 
symbolic objects Φ and Ψ respectively. Let 
S
⇒  be the semiotic implication, and 
S
=  be 
the semiotic equality.  
 
Definition 5: The objects of the allegory A are sets of symbols and we define as 
symbolic objects.  
 
Definition 6: An allegoric morphism Ψ→Φ:A is a binary relation between the 
connotative significances φ and ψ of symbolic objects Φ  and Ψ respectively. Then 
( ) 




 −→−⇒Ψ→Φ ψφ ccA
connote
S
::A . This morphism is referred to as an allegorical 
involution. 
 
Definition 7: Every allegoric morphism ( ) 




 −→−⇒Ψ→Φ ψφ ccA
connote
S
::A is 
associated with an anti-involution ( ) 




 −→−⇒Φ→Ψ − φψ ccA
connote
S
::A 11- .  
 
The allegoric morphisms must obey the following laws:  
 
1) If A1 is an allegoric morphism from Φ to Ψ, in short 
( ) 




 −→−⇒Ψ→Φ ψφ ccA
connote
S
::A 11 , and
( ) 




 −→−⇒Θ→Ψ πψ ccA
connote
S
::A 22 , then there is an allegoric morphism 
21 AA • commonly read A1 composed with A2 from Φ to Θ.  
 
2) The composition of allegoric morphisms is associative, so if 
( ) 




 −→−⇒Ψ→Φ ψφ ccA
connote
S
::A 11 , ( ) 




 −→−⇒Θ→Ψ πψ ccA
connote
S
::A 22 ), 
and ( ) 




 −→−⇒Ω→Θ ωπ ccA
connote
S
::A 23 , then ( ) ( )32131 AAAAAA S ••=•• .  
 
3) For each symbolic object Φ, there is an identity allegoric morphism IΦ(A), such 
that for any ( ) 




 −→−⇒Ψ→Φ ψφ ccA
connote
S
::A , IΦ(A) ● A 
S
=  A and 
A●IΦ(A) 
S
=  A.  
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We adopt the convention that allegoric morphisms compose from right to left, so A1● A 
2 means "first do A 1, then do A 2 ". 
 
Definition 7: The connotative relation between symbolic objects ΨΦ, is a span of the 
allegoric morphism ( ) 




 −→←−⇒Ψ→←Φ ψφ cAcA
connote
S
 that is jointly-monic. 
 
Definition 8: Two such spans ( ) 




 −→←−⇒Ψ→←Φ ψφ cAcA
connote
S 11
and  
( ) 




 −→←−⇒Ψ→←Φ ψφ cAcA
connote
S 22
 are considered equivalent when there is an 
isomorphism between A1 and A2 that makes everything commute.  
 
 
The composition  
( ) 




 −→←−→←−⇒Θ→←Ψ→←Φ πψφ cAcAcAA
connoteconnoteconnoteconnote
S 2121
 is found by 
first pulling back the cospan ( ) 




 ←−→⇒←Ψ← 2121 AcAAA
connoteconnote
S
ψ and then taking 
the jointly-monic image of the resulting span
( ) 




 −→←→←−⇒Θ→←→←Φ πφ cAAcAA
connoteconnoteconnote
S 2121
. 
 
Definition 9: A map is an allegoric morphism that has a right adjoint in the allegory A, 
when A is considered, using the local order structure as a 2-category.  
 
Maps in an allegory A are closed under identity and composition. Thus there is a 
subcategory Map(A) of A, with the same symbolic objects but only the maps as 
allegoric morphisms.  
 
Definition 10: In an allegory A, an involution ( ) 




 −→−⇒Ψ→Φ ψφ ccA
connote
S
::A is 
tabulated by a pair of maps








−→−⇒Φ→Θ φπ ccAA
connote
S
:: 11 , 








−→−⇒Ψ→Θ ψπ ccAA
connote
S
:: 22  if  AAA S=•
−1
12  and IAAAA S=••
−−
2
1
21
1
1  . 
 
Definition 11: An allegory is called tabular, and we designate as AT if every involution 
has a tabulation.  
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Definition 12: A symbolic unit in an allegory is a symbolic object Ф for which the 
identity is the largest involution φφ −→−⇒Φ→Φ cc
connote
S
 and such that from every 
other object there is an entire relation to Ф.  
 
Definition 13: An allegory with a symbolic unit is called unital allegory AO.  
 
Given a tabular allegory AT, the category Map(AT) is a regular symbolic category iff AT 
is unital AO, this is OST AA = . 
 
Definition 14: A symbolic category C consists of the following:  
 
1) A collection of symbolic objects. 
 
2) For each pair of objects a collection of involutions from one to 
another. 
 
3) A binary operation defined on compatible pairs of involutions 
called composition.  
 
The category must satisfy an identity axiom and an associative axiom which is 
analogous to the monoid axioms.  
 
Definition 15:  An allegory A is a symbolic category C(A) in which: 
 
1) If ( ) 




 −→−⇒Ψ→Φ ψφ ccA
connote
S
::A  
 
2) Every pair of involutions A1,A2: Ψ→Φ  with common domain/codomain is 
associated with an intersection, i.e. an involution 
ψφ −→−⇒Ψ→Φ ccAAAA
connote
S
:: 2121  such that has the following properties: 
 
a) Idempotent (A  A 
S
=  A) 
 
b) Commutative (A1A2 
S
=  A2A1) 
 
c) Associative (A1A2)  A3 
S
=A1 ( A2A3) 
 
3) Anti-involution distributes over composition (A1•A2)-1 
S
=  (A-11•A-12) and 
intersection (A1A2)-1 
S
=  (A-11 A-12) .  
 
4) Composition is semi-distributive over intersection: 
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 (A1• (A2A3)⊆  A1•A2  A1•A3), (A1A2)•A3⊆  A1•A3  A2•
A3. 
 
5) The modularity law is satisfied: (A1•A2A3)⊆  (A1A2 •A-13) •A3).  
 
6) The composition of allegoric morphisms is a composition of connotative relations.  
 
7) The intersection of allegoric morphisms is an intersection of connotative relations. 
 
Let C be a symbolic category. Composition of connotative relations will be associative 
if the factorization system is appropriately stable. In this case one may consider a 
symbolic category Rel(C), with the same symbolic objects as C, but where allegorical 
morphisms are connotative relations between the symbolic objects. The identity 
connotative relations are the diagonals of Cartesian product 




 −−→− )()( φφφ cXcc
connot
. 
 
Definition 16: The symbolic category C is regular if it has a terminal term. 
 
For a regular symbolic category C, there is an isomorphism of symbolic categories C = 
Map(Rel(C )).  
For a regular symbolic category C, the allegory Rel(C) is always tabular. On the other 
hand, for any tabular allegory AT, the symbolic category Map(AT) of maps is a locally 
regular symbolic category: it has pullbacks, equalizers and images that are stable under 
pullback7. This is enough to study relations in Map(AT) and, in this setting, AT 
=Rel(Map(AT)).  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
In the contemporary world, a governmental decision can have severe effects upon many 
aspects of our lives. For this reason, labelling policies as military or medical is both 
metaphoric and metonymic. It stands for a larger pattern of cognitions, or it highlights a 
similarity to something familiar while masking other critical features. In doing so it 
legitimizes a specific kind of political authority while degrading the claim of the Public 
to participate in policymaking. Because anxiety about foreign enemies, internal 
subversion and deviant behaviour is frequently reinforced by government officials and 
is especially widespread, military, police and psychiatric authorities benefit most 
consistently from this form of linguistic structuring. Anxiety about economic survival 
and social problems is limited to particular groups, is more sporadic and is constantly 
deflated by governmental claims that the outlook is good. Every regime thinks it is 
politically essential to claim that economic and social policies are working successfully, 
7 In mathematics, a pullback is either of two different, but related processes: pre-composition and fiber-
product. Pre-composition with a function probably provides the most elementary notion of pullback: in 
simple terms, a function f of a variable y, where y itself is a function of another variable x, may be written 
as a function of x. This is the pullback f by the function y(x): ( )( ) ( )f y x g x≡ .This is the case. 
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even while reinforcing fears of foreign and internal enemies. In consequence economic 
and social deprivations that flow from decisions classified as military, security or 
rehabilitative are more readily concealed from the Public through metaphor. Such 
systematic inflation of the forms of threat that legitimize authority and systematic 
deflation of the forms of threat that legitimize domestic redistribution of goods and 
power inevitably have consequences for the effectiveness of public policies. They divert 
resources toward coping with mythical threats and make it unlikely that the real 
problems of the ordinary people will be solved.  
In every significant respect, political issues and actors assume characteristics that are 
symbolically cued. From subtle linguistic evocations and associated governmental 
actions we get a great many of our beliefs about what our problems are, their causes, 
their seriousness, our success or failure in coping with them, which aspects are fixed 
and which are changeable and what impacts they have upon which groups of people. 
We are similarly cued into beliefs about which authorities can deal with which 
problems, the levels of merit and competence of various groups of the population, who 
are allies and who are enemies. Though symbolic cues are not omnipotent, they define 
the geography and topography of everyone's ideological world (Edelman, 1985). 
From historical times we have known that the rhetorical formulas specified certain 
ideological positions.  We can identify these ideological positions as a very precise 
world vision, made and explained by mediation of structural models. As Rhetoric and 
ideology intimately overlap we can anticipate that neither can act independently. 
According to Eco (1968), a revision of the ideological expectations can be proposed 
appealing to redundancy i.e., to a purely referential function of the messages. Then: 
 
1) Each real upheaval of the ideological expectations is effective in the 
measure that messages upset systems of rhetorical expectations. 
2) Each deep upheaval of the rhetorical expectations is as well a summary 
of the ideological expectations.  There is a clear relation between 
Rhetoric and ideology. Therefore:  
3) The ideology may be considered as a cultural unit that is similar to a 
rhetorical formula as a significant unit.  
 
For that reason it is possible to construct a connotative code that corresponds to any 
rhetorical expression of an individualized ideological unit (Nescolarde-Selva and Usó-
Doménech, 2013c,d; Usó-Doménech and Nescolarde-Selva, 2012).  
Ideological belief systems assume their status as natural common sense for groups of 
minds by reification, which Georg Lukács (1980) defines as the abstraction of 
relationships and processes into ideological objects of thought, and which is one of the 
most common operations of allegory. Conceptual blending offers a model of this 
process in allegory that is particularly revealing, and I claim that such a model 
extrapolates well to ideological systems generally. Allegory, that is, with its walking 
and talking reifications, provides an excellent testing ground for ideological belief 
formation and maintenance, and the lessons conceptual blending can teach us about the 
cognitive dimensions of allegory can teach us more broadly about the cognitive 
construction of ideology. 
Ideological beliefs are reified through abductive inference, where observation and 
interpretation blend with attitudes and values to form mentally objective abstractions 
out of subjective processes and relationships.  The resultant reified beliefs chain into 
ideological belief systems to form the basis of ideological thought. According to 
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Marxist Theory, allegory existed to reflect and reinforce what were held to be proper 
relationships between the feudal and renaissance ruling class ideologies. (Cantarow, 
1972).  We believe allegory reifies thought while at the same time dereifying 
ideological beliefs.  Fauconnier and Turner’s conceptual blending theory (2002) and 
Teun van Dijk’s theory of context models (2008) model the dereifying effect of allegory 
on ideological mental spaces and in so doing form new mental spaces of ideological 
belief. 
Allegory achieves dereification of ideological belief systems by forming blended mental 
spaces that weaken the reified nature of ideological belief spaces.   Allegorically 
blended mental spaces result in a mental foregrounding of ideological spaces through 
what Mark Turner refers to as a waking up the generic space (1996).  The generic 
mental space contains elements that the input spaces of an allegory have in common and 
is itself a blend of other mental spaces including ideological belief systems.  We believe 
generic spaces to be platforms that hold a wide range of mental space categories from 
beliefs of truth and fact to opinions, values, and attitudes.  Generic platforms create 
what van Dijk refers to as a context model or the group of blended mental spaces that 
serve as interface between discourse and conceptual integration. 
Allegorical blends shift the generic platform by disrupting categories of belief.  Beliefs 
about truth subsumed by ideology may be shown to be opinion.  Allegory does not 
disprove or reject ideological beliefs; dereification may reaffirm or disavow depending 
on the individual and the context of the model constructed.  Dereified belief spaces 
immediately reify back into concrete abstractions that form new ideological spaces as 
the chain of blending continues.  It is in the instant when reified beliefs lose objectivity 
that allegory has its cognitively rhetorical effect on the construction of ideology.  
No belief system, no ideology, no religion is immune from self-serving delusional 
tenets linked to false perceptions of reality, although, in due time, each of them will 
undergo the process of demythologization and eventually become a laughing stock for 
those who see the illusions underlying these delusional myths.  People have always 
wished, by means of different allegories, to transcend their cursed reality and make 
frequent excursions into the spheres of the hyperreal, the unreal, or the surreal — in 
order to offset the absurdity of their existence. It is natural that they resort to religious 
and ideological devices, however aberrant or criminal these allegorical devices may 
subsequently turn out to be.  
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